Begbie
R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115
Parties and outcome
- Claimant
- Heather Begbie (appellant)
- Defendant
- Secretary of State for Education and Employment
- Outcome
- The Secretary of State won: Begbie’s appeal was dismissed.
Cited by
- Bibi
23.. To a degree the answer to the second depends on the approach one takes to the first. As Laws L.J. pointed out in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115 at page 1131C “The more the decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the macro-political field, the less intrusive will be the court's supervision. More than this: in that field, true abuse of power is less likely to be found, since within it changes of policy, fuelled by broad conceptions of the public interest, may more readily be accepted as taking precedence over the interests of groups which enjoyed expectations generated by an earlier policy.” Has the authority acted unlawfully? Introduction
28.. As indicated in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie 2000 1 W.L.R. 1115 reliance, though potentially relevant in most cases, is not essential. In that case a letter sent to the parents of one child affected by legislative and policy changes concerning assisted school places came to the knowledge of another child's parent, who relied on it in judicial review proceedings. Peter Gibson LJ, giving the leading judgment, said at page 1123H: “Mr. Beloff submits … (v) it is not necessary for a person to have changed his position as a result of such representations for an obligation to fulfil a legitimate expectation to subsist; the principle of good administration prima facie requires adherence by public authorities to their promises. He cites authority in support of all these submissions and for my part I am prepared to accept them as correct, so far as they go. I would however add a few words by way of comment on his fifth proposition, as in my judgment it would be wrong to understate the significance of reliance in this area of the law. It is very much the exception, rather than the rule, that detrimental reliance will not be present when the court finds unfairness in the defeating of a legitimate expectation”.
- Nadarajah
54.The next case is Ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, decided on 20 August 1999, just over a month after judgment was given in Coughlan. The applicant was a child whose place at a private school was funded publicly through the Assisted Places Scheme which had been introduced by the previous government. After the general election on 1 May 1997 the new government introduced legislation (the Education (Schools) Act 1997) to change the policy, phasing out the benefits of the Assisted Places Scheme. The consequence for the applicant was that she would retain her assisted place only until the end of the year in which she completed her primary education, unless the Secretary of State extended it by the specific exercise of a statutory discretion in her favour. Her circumstances, unfortunately, were not within the policy considerations which had been announced as promoting a favourable exercise of the discretion in particular cases. However it was contended on her behalf, ultimately in judicial review proceedings, that (I summarise) assurances had been given by government to the effect that the applicant and other children in like position would enjoy their assisted places throughout their secondary education, and that these assurances gave rise to a legitimate expectation that they would be honoured. In fact, the policy of the government and the effect of the Act of 1997 had been incompetently misrepresented.
- Bancoult (No 2)
60.The relevant principles of administrative law were not in dispute between the parties and I do not think that this is an occasion on which to re-examine the jurisprudence. It is clear that in a case such as the present, a claim to a legitimate expectation can be based only upon a promise which is "clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification": see Bingham LJ in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, 1569. It is not essential that the applicant should have relied upon the promise to his detriment, although this is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an abuse of power and such a change of policy may be justified in the public interest, particularly in the area of what Laws LJ called "the macro-political field": see R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1131.
135.The basis of the jurisdiction is abuse of power and unfairness to the citizen on the part of a public authority: see Coughlan, para 82. On this basis it has been held that two factors, both present in the case before the House, tend to show that there has not been an abuse of power. The first is when the authority changes its policy on sufficient public grounds. If there is an overriding public interest behind its change of policy, it will not be an abuse of power: Coughlan, para 57; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1130-1131. The second factor is whether the claimant has relied on the promise or representation, in particular whether he has thereby suffered any detriment. The Court of Appeal has affirmed the necessity for this. In Begbie Peter Gibson LJ said at 1123-1124 that it would be "wrong to understate the significance of reliance in this area of the law. It is very much the exception, rather than the rule, that detrimental reliance will not be present when the court finds unfairness in the defeating of a legitimate expectation." Cf also R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2002] 1 WLR 237, 246, where the court adopted at para 29 the statement in Craig, Administrative Law, 4th ed, p 619 that "detrimental reliance will normally be required." If it could be said, contrary to my opinion, that the press statement of 3 November 2000 did contain a sufficiently clear and unambiguous promise or representation, these factors would militate against affording a remedy to the Chagossians.
178.The approach in Coughlan has been applied and considered in subsequent Court of Appeal authorities, particularly R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237 and R (Nadarajah and Abdi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363. The judgments in all of these authorities are helpful in illuminating the issues. In Ex p Begbie Laws LJ (drawing on para 60 of Lord Woolf's judgment in Coughlan) underlined the importance that may attach to whether the decisions in question affect only a few individuals or involve wide-ranging questions of general policy, moving into the "macro-political" field, where judges may well be in no position to adjudicate save at most on a bare Wednesbury basis (pp 1130A-1131D).
- Paponette
28. In a case where the legitimate expect ation is based on a promise or representation, a useful summary of the relevant principles was given by Lord Hoffmann in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of Stat e for Foreign an d Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] AC 453, at para 60: “It is clear that in a case such as the present, a claim to a legitimate expectation can be based only upon a promise which is ‘clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification’: see Bingham LJ in R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, 1569. It is not essential that the applicant should have relied upon the promise to his detrim ent, although this is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an abus e of power and such a change of policy may be justified in the public in terest, particularly in the area of what Laws LJ called ‘the macro-political field’: see R v Secretary of State for Education and Em ployment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1131.”
- Morris (2019)
39. In R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2009] 1 AC 453, Lord Hoffmann said, at [60]: “The relevant principles of administrative law were not in dispute between the parties and I do not think that this is an occasion on which to re-examine the jurisprudence. It is clear that in a case such as the present, a claim to a legitimate expectation can be based only upon a promise which is “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”: see Bingham LJ in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, 1569. It is not essential that the applicant should have relied upon the promise to his detriment, although this is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an abuse of power and such a change of policy may be justified in the public interest, particularly in the area of what Laws LJ called “the macro-political field”: see R v Secretary of State for Educati on and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1131.” In considering whether the representations relied upon to found the legitimate expectation were “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”, the question is how, on a fair re ading of the promise, it would have been reasonably understood to those to whom it was made: see R (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] QB 1397, per Dyson LJ, at [56].”